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CASES NOTED
consequential indeed, but not nearly so far-reaching. Mr. Justice Stewart
seems to begin his opinion correctly by stating that "what is here invoked
is the Court's supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice
in the federal courts." 30 Then, apparently losing sight of this invocation,
he indulges in a constitutional argument unnecessary to the result reached.
He attempts to show that as a result of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's statement
in Wolf v. Colorado,31 the majority is justified in overthrowing the "silver
platter" doctrine. This rationale could be expected were the Court excluding
illegally-obtained evidence from a state prosecution. This the Court was
not called upon to do. Instead, it has extended its undisputed supervisory
power over the federal courts to exclude all unlawfully-obtained evidence
from federal prosecutions, no matter what the source. But while the Court
.has reached a logical and necessary result, it appears to have compromised
itself by rebutting the unjustified reasoning of the "silver platter" doctrine
first set forth in Weeks v. United States,a2 rather than merely reaffirming
its inherent power over the federal courts.
PHILIP N. SMITH
DUE PROCESS-RIGHT TO SELECT
COUNSEL
Petitioner was found guilty of burglary and sentenced to the state
prison. The trial judge allowed defense counsel to withdraw five days before
the trial, and refused to appoint counsel or grant petitioner's request for
a continuance so that he could obtain his own counsel. By habeas corpus
proceedings the petitioner challenged the legality of his conviction.
Held: conviction set aside since the denial of a reasonable opportunity to
employcounsel violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution and the Florida Constitution. Cash v.
Culver, 122 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1960). 1
30. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 Sup. Ct. 1437, 1443 (1960).
31. "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police
is ... implicit in the 'concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
32. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
1. After Cash's conviction in 1955 he was sent to Raiford prison to serve a
15-year sentence. No appeal was taken. While in prison he drew up a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus which he sent to the Florida Supreme Court. This petition
alleged: (1) that he had requested the court to appoint counsel and this request was
refused, and (2) that the court refused to grant a continuance, after his attorney
had withdrawn five days before the trial began, so that he could obtain counsel. He
contended both of these actions of the trial judge violated dne process of law. The
Florida Supreme Court denied the petition without hearing or opinion.Thereafter, having obtained an attorney, he petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging the same facts he had brought before the
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Section Eleven of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution 2
has been construed consistently by the Florida Supreme Court to guarantee
a defendant in all criminal actions the absolute right to secure counsel of
his own choosing3 and a reasonable time to consult with his attorney.4  A
clear discussion of this rigid requirement is found in Deeb v. State5 wherein
the court said:
. . . the absolute command of the constitution that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused ': . . shall be heard by himself
or counsel or both is more than a right secured to the accused. It
is a mandatory organic rule of procedure in all criminal prosecutions
in all courts of this state.6
Other states have similar constitutional provisions guaranteeing the
accused the right to counsel of his own selection. 7 While the right to select
counsel is said to be absolute, a distinction has been drawn, in both the state
and federal courts, between such right and the right to have counsel
appointed by the court.
state court. In addition, he concluded his petition with the statement that he, "a
19-year-old farm boy, without education or any knowledge of trial law" was forced to
conduct his own defense. The Supreme Court, noting the only record before them
was the petition and the facts therein alleged, held that:
[11f petitioner's allegations be true, he was denied the due process of law
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and it was incumbent on the state
court to determine what the true facts were. Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633,
638 (1959).
The case was remanded to the Florida Supreme Court with orders to issue the writ
and determine the facts. The writ was issued, a hearing held, and the judgment of
the court was announced in Cash v. Culver, 120 So.2d 590 (Fla. 1960). The court
first noted that at the hearing Cash admitted that he had not requested the trial
judge to appoint counsel. Nevertheless, the court went into the record to determine
whether the facts brought the case within the rule of Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942),
to the extent that due process required counsel to be appointed even without request.
The court concluded that it did not and noted that Cash "conducted his defense
with almost unbelievable competency for a layman." Concerning the second allegation,
that denial of continuance had operated to deny Cash a reasonable opportunity to
employ counsel and thus denied him due process of law, the court noted the holding of
the United States Supreme Court in Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954), and also the
guarantees of the Florida Declaration of Rights, infra note 2. The court said, "we
are not at this point holding that the record submitted necessarily leads to the conclusion
that Cash was denied a reasonable chance to employ another lawyer." The court then
appointed a Circuit Court judge to serve as commissioner of the court, gather the
facts and make a speedy report. It is the hearing on the commissioner's report that
forms the instant case. It is interesting to note that no new facts were adduced from
the commissioner's report than were available to the court at the time it denied,
without hearing, Cash's original petition.
2. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a speedy
and public trial . . . anid shall be heard by himself, or counsel, or both .... "
3. Wood v. State, 155 Fla. 256, 19 So.2d 872 (1944); Messer v. State, 120
Fla. 95, 162 So. 146 (1935); Reed v. State, 94 Fla. 32, 113 So. 630 (1927); May v.
State, 89 Fla. 78, 103 So. 115 (1925).
4. Christie v. State, 94 Fla. 469, 114 So. 450 (1927); Coker v. State, 82 Fla.
5, 89 So. 222 (1921).
5. 131 Fla. 362, 179 So. 894 (1937).
6. Id. at 373, 179 So. at 898-99.
7. Phrases in each of the constitutions vary to a limited degree. Those which
state the right as "to appear and defend in person and by counsel" are: ARIz. CONST.
art. 2, § 24; COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 16; ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 9; Mo. CONST. art. 2,
§ 22; MONT. CONST. art. 3, § 16; N. M. CONST. art. 2, § 14; S.D. CONST. art. 6,
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Prior to 1932, there was no federal constitutional requirement that the
state appoint counsel for indigent defendants in criminal actions. In Powell
v. Alabama," the United States Supreme Court held that due process of
law, as embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment, required representation
by counsel in all state capital cases. As a result, it became mandatory for
the states to provide counsel for indigent defendants in such cases. This
decision has been implemented by state statutes, similar to Florida's,
which require appointment of counsel in capital cases. 9
Eleven years later, the United States Supreme Court in Betts v. Brady'0
held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could require
the appointment of counsel in actions in the state court for non-capital
crimes. The Court refused to enumerate the situations which would require
the appointment of counsel or even decide what facts in a case might be such
that due process would require appointment." Rather, the Court stated that
each case would be decided on its facts because:
T]hat which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental
aimess, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other
circumstances, and the light of other considerations, fall short of
such denial.
12
In Chandler v. Fretag13 the Court held what previous decisions 14 had
clearly implied. The court announced that there was a definite distinction
§ 7; UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 12; Wyo. CONST. art. 1, § 10. Other states phrase the
right as "to be heard by himself and his counsel": ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 10; DEL.
CONST. art. 1, § 7; INn. CONST. art. 1, § 13; Ky. CONST. § 11; PA. CONST. art. 1,
§ 9; TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 9; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 10. Or "by himself and
counsel": N.H. CONST. part 1, § 15; WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 7. Or "by himself and
by counsel": CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 9. Also, "by himself and counsel or either":
ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 6. Or, as in Florida, "by himself and counsel or both": Miss.
CONST. art. 3, § 26; S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 10. Or "to
appear and defend in person and with counsel": CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 13; IDAHO
CONST. art. 1, § 13; N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 10. And "in
person or by counsel": KAN. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS § 10; NEB. CONST. art. 1,
§ 11; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 10; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 8; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
Or "himself and his counsel or either at his election": MAss. CONST. part 1, § 12;
ME. CONST. art. 1, § 6. Or "to be allowed counsel": MD. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS
art. 21.
8. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
9. "In all capital cases where the defendant is insolvent, the judge shall appoint
such counsel for the defendant as he shall deem necessary ..... FLA. STAT. § 909.21
(1959)
1. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
11. The Court in Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948), set down
some of the factors which must be considered in determining, in each case, whether
such denial of counsel was a violation of due process. This case involved a prosecution
for burglary and the Court stated: "Where the gravity of the crime and other factors,
such as the age and education of the defendant, the conduct of the court or the
prosecuting officials, and the complicated nature of the offense charged and the possible
defenses thereto, render criminal proceedings without counsel so apt to result in injustice
as to be fundamentally unfair . the constitution requires that the accused must
have legal assistance at his trial.
12. 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
13. 348 U.S. 3 (1954).
14. House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945).
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between the right to obtain counsel in a criminal action and the right to
have counsel appointed. The former was held to be absolute, the latter,
except in capital cases, conditional. 5
In the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court, relying upon the United
States Supreme Court decisions in this field and the provisions of both
federal and state constitutions, held that refusal of the trial court to grant
a continuance denied the petitioner the right to obtain counsel and this was
a denial of due process of law.
The instant case involved no new principle of law, and, considering prior
decisions, the result might be said to have been expected. At the same time,
viewing the five-year history of this case16 two questions might be asked.
In light of the fact that the Florida Supreme Court said that "the instant
case does not require any novel recognition of a constitutional claim,"'17 why
did it take five years to reach this decision?
Secondly, the court criticized the trial judge for failing at the outset of
the case to have a "straightforward recognition of the organic rights of one
accused of a crime."'18 Admitting the criticism to be valid, could not the
same criticism be leveled at this court for failing to recognize these same
rights alleged in the first petition for habeas corpus which it denied without
hearing three years previously?
RICHARD B. KNIGHT
CONFLICT OF LAWS-VALIDITY OF GAMBLING
NOTE
In an action based on a check issued in Nevada on a Florida bank,
the drawer pleaded that the check had been given for money previously
loaned for the purpose of gambling. The trial court in granting recovery
to the original bearer ruled that the evidence supported a finding that the
bearer had no knowledge of the purpose for which the drawer intended
to utilize the money. Held, affirmed: the finding of the lower court was
not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The appellate court, how-
ever, stated that: "A gambling obligation although valid in the state where
15. "Regardless of whether petitioner would have been entitled to the appointment
of counsel, his right to be heard through his own counsel was unqualified . . . . [and]
a necessary corollary is that a -defendant must be given a reasonable opportunity to
employ and consult with counsel; otherwise, the right to be heard by counsel would be
of little worth." 348 U.S. 3, 9-10 (1954).
16. See discussion, note 1 supra.
17. Cash v. Culver, 122 So.2d 179, 187 (Fla. 1960).
18. Ibid.
[VOL. XV
